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Consumption risk sharing among U.S. federal states increases in booms and decreases in 
recessions. We find that small firms’ access to credit markets plays an important role in 
explaining this stylized fact: business cycle fluctuations in aggregate risk sharing are more 
pronounced in states in which small firms account for a large share income or employment. In 
addition, better access of small firms to credit markets in the wake of state-level banking 
deregulation during the 1980s seems to have loosened the dependence of aggregate risk 
sharing on the business cycle. Not only do our result support that better access to credit 
markets may have made it easier for the owners of small firms to smooth income in the face 
of adverse cash-flows shocks to their business. They suggest a major additional benefit from 
banking deregulation: access to bank credit has become more reliable and is more easily 
available when households and firms need it most urgently - in economic downturns. 
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Markets. 1 Introduction
Consumption risk sharing among U.S. federal states increases in booms and
decreases in recessions. We ￿nd that small ￿rms￿access to credit markets
plays an important role in explaining this stylized fact: business cycle ￿ uc-
tuations in aggregate risk sharing are more pronounced in states in which
small ￿rms account for a large share of income or employment. Better access
of small ￿rms to credit markets in the wake of state-level banking deregula-
tion during the 1980s has, however, dampened the dependence of aggregate
risk sharing on the business cycle.
Our analysis places itself at the intersection of two important recent
strands of the literature. The ￿rst strand emphasizes that the degree to
which certain household groups and small ￿rms have access to ￿nancial mar-
kets varies dramatically over the business cycle. In particular, a considerable
body of theoretical and empirical work on the ￿nancial accelerator1 has ar-
gued that tightening collateral constraints in credit markets may act as a
potentially powerful ampli￿cation mechanism for aggregate shocks. Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) were among the ￿rst to illustrate empirically that small
￿rms with their strong dependence on bank ￿nance are particularly exposed
to such shocks.
We provide a comprehensive taxonomy of business cycle variation in in-
terstate risk sharing. First, we show that the extent to which interstate risk
sharing varies with the aggregate output cycle is quantitatively important:
over our sample period, which ranges from 1963-98, on average almost 80
percent of state-speci￿c shocks to output are shared across state-borders.
However, this average masks considerable variation over time: at the trough
1We will not attempt to survey this work here. Leading examples include Bernanke
(1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)) among others.
1of the typical NBER recession during that period, the fraction of risk shared
was almost 20 percentage points below this level. This dependence of aggre-
gate risk sharing on the business cycle is robust to controls for other factors
such as stock market and in particular housing price ￿ uctuations which, as
recently argued by Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005, 2008), may also
a⁄ect the ability of households to share risk across regional borders.
Secondly, we identify the sources of the procyclical variation in interstate
risk sharing. Speci￿cally, we ask through which channels risk is shared
and how the contribution of these channels varies over time. Building on
Asdrubali, Słrensen and Yosha (1996) we distinguish between three channels
of risk sharing: income smoothing (through interstate ￿ ows of capital and
labor income), ￿scal transfers and consumption smoothing through personal
savings and dissavings. As the main source of the procyclicality in aggregate
consumption risk sharing we identify strong procyclical ￿ uctuations in the
extent to which a region￿ s households can smooth consumption through
savings and dissavings. Importantly, this very characteristic pattern of risk
sharing over the business cycle is more pronounced in federal states where
small businesses are particularly prevalent as employers or where the income
of small business owners accounts for a large share of state personal income.
To show that it is truly small business access to credit that is key in
explaining the time-variation in aggregate risk sharing, we connect to a
second strand of the literature. Starting with Jayaratne and Strahan (1996),
a series of studies has exploited the experience of U.S. state-level banking
deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s as a natural laboratory in which
to study the e⁄ect of liberalizations on growth, the comovement of regional
business cycles (Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004)) and, more recently, risk
sharing (Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Słrensen (2007), Acharya, Imbs and
2Sturgess (2006)). We build on these papers in arguing that this wave of
deregulation has had a signi￿cant impact on small ￿rm access to credit:
small ￿rms typically cannot issue stocks or bonds and therefore heavily rely
on bank ￿nance. The key aspect we emphasize here is that this makes them
vulnerable to changes in local credit market conditions which tend to worsen
in downturns and to improve in booms. At the same time, the business
and private ￿nance of small business owners are closely intertwined so that
￿ uctuations in the access to business credit are also likely to a⁄ect the ability
to smooth personal consumption over time. State-level banking deregulation
transformed a highly fragmented, localized banking system into a system
with larger banks that can pool funds across local and state boundaries. We
conjecture that this makes the availability of credit less dependent on the
phase of the business cycle and that small ￿rms would be prime bene￿ciaries
of such a development.
Our results provide strong support for this hypothesis. We document
that intrastate banking deregulation has dramatically lowered the variabil-
ity of risk sharing over the cycle: before deregulation, each additional per-
centage point of GDP growth increased aggregate risk sharing by around
3-4 percentage points. This variability in the extent to which state-level
idiosyncratic risks can be shared across the nation has almost vanished as a
result of the abolition of intrastate bank branching and merger restrictions.
Small ￿rms seem to have played an important role in transmitting the ef-
fects of this deregulation to the real economy: the procyclical pattern in
risk sharing is reduced most strongly in those states where small businesses
account for a large share of income or employment.
This paper is possibly most closely related to Demyanyk, Ostergaard and
Słrensen (2007) who show that interstate income smoothing increased by
3around 15 percentage points on average following banking deregulation. We
extend the results by Demyanyk et al. (2007) by showing that the increase
in income smoothing is part of a larger shift in the patterns of interstate
consumption risk sharing: banking deregulation seems to have lowered the
contribution from consumption smoothing out of income (through savings
and dissavings) while allowing better smoothing of income in the face of
state-speci￿c output shocks. While interesting in its own right, this shift
implies that the net e⁄ect of banking deregulation on the longer-term aver-
age level of consumption risk sharing has overall been rather small. However
￿and that is the gist of our results ￿banking deregulation has made con-
sumption risk sharing a lot steadier over the cycle. In particular, this means
that consumption risk is almost 20 percentage points higher than it used to
be before deregulation in the average recession.
The welfare costs of aggregate business cycles critically depend on the
extent of heterogeneity among economic agents. Therefore, the reduction in
the variability of interstate risk sharing that we document here is a poten-
tially important source of the aggregate bene￿ts from banking deregulation.
Since small ￿rms are especially exposed to aggregate shocks (Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994)), it is important they can keep borrowing in recessions.
The abolition of state bank branching regulations seems to have achieved
exactly this: especially in states with lots of small ￿rms, access to credit has
become much less dependent on the state of the aggregate economy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section,
we introduce our empirical framework and use it to document the procyclical
nature of aggregate risk sharing. We then present our data and the details
of the empirical implementation in section three. In section four we discuss
our results. Section ￿ve concludes.
42 Consumption risk sharing over the business cy-
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t is per capita consumption in federal state k in period t, GSPk
t
is gross state product per head and the asterisk denotes the national per
capita average of the respective variable. In such a regression, we can think
of the estimate of ￿U as the amount of uninsured idiosyncratic output risk.
Regressions such as (1) by now have some tradition in the both the
microeconometric as well as in the macro literature. Mace (1991), Cochrane
(1991) and Townsend (1994) were the ￿rst to suggest regressions similar to
(1) on household level data as a test of the null of complete markets. Here,
we follow the macroeconomic literature on risk sharing (Asdrubali et al.
(1996), Crucini (1999)) and assume that each federal state is represented by
a stand-in consumer. In a world with complete markets, growth in marginal






where s indexes the state of nature and ￿(s) is the growth in the shadow-
price of consumption. A key implication of (2) is that if risk is e¢ ciently
allocated, marginal utility growth should be independent of country-speci￿c
variables. To the extent that we can associate changes in marginal utility
with consumption growth, consumption growth should therefore be inde-
pendent of a region￿ s business cycle risks - regressions of the form (1) should
5yield a coe¢ cient of zero. More recently, Asdrubali, Słrensen and Yosha
(1996) have argued that the estimate of ￿U may be more generally infor-
mative: even if the null of complete ￿nancial markets is rejected, ￿U still is
a measure of market incompleteness. In panel regressions, ￿U is regularly
between 0 and unity, so that 1 ￿ ￿U can straightforwardly be interpreted
as the share of the average region￿ s idiosyncratic risk that gets laid o⁄ in
￿nancial markets, whereas ￿U is the portion of non-diversi￿ed idiosyncratic
risk faced by the average region.
Estimates of ￿U based on regional data typically fall into the range be-
tween 0:2 ￿ 0:3, a quarter to a third of a region￿ s idiosyncratic output risk
remains uninsured. Based on our U.S. state-level data set here, we obtain
an estimate of 0:22. Such estimates are typically based on panel regressions
such as (1) and they do not allow for the possibility that the amount of risk
sharing that a group of regions achieves may actually be varying over the
business cycle.
In this paper we argue that aggregate risk sharing varies over the business
cycle because certain groups of households may ￿nd it harder to obtain
consumption insurance in ￿nancial markets during recessions than during
booms. In particular, many small ￿rms heavily rely on access to bank loans,
i.e. to credit markets, to smooth ￿ uctuations in business cash ￿ ow. It is
well documented that credit market frictions tend to hit small ￿rms harder
than bigger ￿rms that can issue their own bonds or may even be able to
raise equity in stock markets. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that the
credit channel of monetary policy has a much stronger impact on small ￿rms
than on bigger ￿rms. Fluctuations in cash ￿ ow and in the availability of
credit over the business cycle may therefore a⁄ect the degree of consumption
risk sharing that the proprietors of small businesses and possibly also their
6employees can achieve. In this way, credit market restrictions may translate
into ￿ uctuations in aggregate risk sharing across regions.
We present ￿rst evidence to this e⁄ect in ￿gure 1: the ￿gure plots a
sequence of cross-sectional estimates of the coe¢ cient ￿U. To obtain this
sequence, we run the regression (1) as a cross-sectional regression for each
year in our sample period that ranges from 1964 to 1998:
￿e ck
t = ￿U(t)￿g gsp
k
t + ￿t + "k
t (3)
where t = 1964:::1998, ￿t is the constant of the time t cross-sectional re-
gression and "k
t the disturbance term. Here, and in the remainder of the
paper, we use lower-case letters with a tilde to denote logarithmic devia-
















. The solid line in ￿gure (1) represents the sequence
f￿U(t)g, the dashed line is aggregate U.S. real GDP growth. The sequence
of risk sharing coe¢ cients has a mean of roughly 0:2 but it ￿ uctuates dra-
matically over the cycle: ￿U(t) displays a strong negative correlation (￿0:48)
with aggregate GDP growth ￿the share of non-diversi￿ed state-level idio-
syncratic risk increases in recessions and decreases in booms.
7Notes: This ￿gure reports uninsured risk component ￿U vs. GDP growth rates. ￿U-sequence
is estimated as cross-sectional regression (3) for each year over 1963-1998.
As we show in the remainder of the paper, this cyclical pattern in ￿U(t)
is more pronounced in states were small businesses are important. Closer
inspection of ￿gure (1) also reveals that the negative correlation between
￿U(t) and GDP growth breaks towards the end of the sample period, after
1985. We will argue that this decline in the comovement of ￿U(t) with the
business cycle is the result of banking deregulation at the state level during
the 1970s and 80s. Deregulation seems to have made small business access
to credit a lot steadier, thus virtually removing the correlation between
aggregate risk sharing and the business cycle.
2.1 Patterns of risk sharing
The coe¢ cient ￿U in (3) tells us how much of the idiosyncratic risk faced by
the average federal state remains uninsured at time t. In order to obtain a
8better understanding of the nature of the frictions that drive time variation
in ￿U(t), we also want to know how risk sharing is achieved. Building on
Asdrubali, Słrensen and Yosha (1996), we therefore explicitly consider three
channels of interstate risk sharing.
We refer to the ￿rst channel as income smoothing: to what extent do
net interstate capital and labour income ￿ ows help insure income against
￿ uctuations in output? To capture net interstate capital and labour income
￿ ows, we look at the wedge between output (gross state product, GSP) and
state level income (SI). Since the original paper by Asdrubali et al. (1996)
the literature has generally associated this channel with net factor (mainly:
capital) income ￿ ows from other states and conveniently refers to it as the
capital market channel. While this interpretation is highly intuitive, for
our purposes here it is important to note that state income does not re￿ ect
all income ￿ ows to a state. State income excludes income ￿ ows to legal
entities (such as incorporated ￿rms) in as far as this income is not eventually
disbursed to private households. In this respect SI di⁄ers from the income
concept underlying gross national product (GNP) that is used in national
income accounting. Since GNP data is not available at the state level, it
is therefore not possible to disentangle risk sharing through net interstate
factor income ￿ ows from the intrastate income smoothing achieved through
the balance sheets of legal entities. Small ￿rms - that are our focus here - are
often registered as limited liability companies or in other quasi-incorporated
forms (such as S-corporations), and we discuss below in which respect this
distinction might matter for some of our ￿ndings.2
The second channel we consider are net ￿scal transfers￿either through
2Speci￿cally, the extent to which small (incorporated) ￿rms have access to credit mar-
kets could a⁄ect the way in which they disburse dividends to their owners and may there-
fore also a⁄ect the choice of income smoothing vs. other channels of risk sharing. See in
particular our discussion surrounding footnote 10 below.
9the progressivity of the tax system or through the social security system both
of which may allow residents of a federal state to further smooth disposable
relative to state income. For brevity, and in line with the extant literature,
we call this channel the ￿scal channel.
Finally, there may be further consumption smoothing through credit
markets at the individual (household) level, after (disposable) income for the
current period is known. This e⁄ectively amounts to households smoothing
their consumption through savings and dissavings. We therefore refer to
this third channel as consumption smoothing.
To gauge the contribution of each of these channels to aggregate risk
sharing, we run the following panel regressions:
￿g gsp
k
t ￿ ￿e si
k
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where si and dsi denote the logarithms of state level income and disposable
income respectively. Since all states face aggregate US-wide shocks that
cannot be insured by de￿nition, we focus on the idiosyncratic, state-speci￿c
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t). With this speci￿cation
we control for common time-speci￿c e⁄ects. The coe¢ cients ￿k
X capture
state-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects.
The theoretical values of the coe¢ cients in the above set of regressions
10are
￿I = cov(￿g gsp
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￿I + ￿F + ￿C = 1 ￿ ￿U
by construction. Hence, the set of regressions (4) provides us with a complete
decomposition of the cross-sectional variance of state-speci￿c output growth.
In this way we obtain not only a picture of how much risk is shared (1￿￿U),
but we also get a breakdown into the contribution of the di⁄erent channels
to aggregate risk sharing (the coe¢ cients ￿I, ￿F and ￿C). We call the vector
￿= [￿I;￿F;￿C;￿U] the pattern of risk sharing. So far, the regression setup
we have presented here assumes that ￿ is time-invariant. In our empirical
implementation, we allow for the possibility that ￿ varies over time and also
between federal states. The next section presents our data set and discusses
how we capture such variation in the patterns of risk sharing.
3 Empirical implementation
3.1 Data
We use a panel of variables for the 50 U.S. states and for Washington D.C.
for the period 1963-1998. All data is annual. To measure regional risk
sharing on each level we employ an updated version of the data set used by
Asdrubali et al. (1996). These data consist of annual gross state product
11and personal income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Disposable state income is constructed as state income plus federal transfers,
minus total federal taxes raised in the state. State consumption consists of
state/local government and private consumption. Since private consumption
data at the state level is not available, state private consumption is estimated
as the state retail sales data rescaled by the ratio of total (US-wide) private
consumption to total US retail sales. Real gross domestic product is the sum
of gross state products over all states. All these variables are in per capita
terms and de￿ ated by the price index for personal consumption expenditure.
Growth rates of real per capita variables are calculated as ￿rst di⁄erences
of natural logarithms of per capita de￿ ated level values. Further details on
all data and their preparation are provided in the appendix.
We consider two measures of the importance of small businesses in a
federal state. Our ￿rst and principal measure is the share of proprietors￿
income in state personal income. This measure of proprietors￿income or
proprietary income is readily obtained from the regional economic account
tables available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The second
measure is the share of small business employment in total state employ-
ment. This measure de￿nes establishments as ￿ small￿if they have less than
100 employees. However, these data are recorded only for the period after
1977. They are available from the Geospatial and Statistical Data Center
at the University of Virginia library.
Recession and expansion dates are from NBER Business Cycle Data
Base.
123.2 Capturing time- and state variation in interstate risk
sharing
To explore business cycle ￿ uctuations in the pattern of risk sharing as well
as its variation across federal states, we parametrize ￿ as a function of aggre-
gate variables. In addition, we control for (potentially time-varying) state-







X(t) = ￿X0 + zk0
t ￿X1 (5)
for X = I;F;C;U. Here, ￿X0 measures the average amount of risk insured
via income, ￿scal, and consumption smoothing and uninsured risk respec-
tively when zk
t equals zero. ￿X1 gives the marginal e⁄ect on risk sharing
through channel X that is induced by shifts in zk
t. We partition zk
t into
aggregate, time-varying (x0
t) and time-invariant state-speci￿c (u0k) charac-
teristics. In addition, we allow for characteristics that can vary across both
state and time (y0k








By plugging (5) into the panel sharing regressions (4) above and mul-
tiplying out, we then obtain a set of interaction terms with ￿g gsp
k
t. The
coe¢ cients on these interaction terms then correspond to the respective
coe¢ cients in the vector ￿X1 and allow us to calculate ￿k
X(t) given the ag-
gregate and state speci￿c characteristics at time t. We generally estimate
panel OLS regressions of the form










with xt = ￿g gsp
k








t ￿ ￿e ck
t, ￿e ck
t and for X =
I;F;C;U respectively. Besides the usual time-invariant state-speci￿c (￿k
X)
13e⁄ects, this speci￿cation also includes state-invariant time-￿xed (￿X
t ) ef-
fects, even though ￿g gsp
k
t and xt are already measured as deviations from
the cross-sectional (i.e. national) mean. This keeps our regressions parsi-
monious while avoiding spuriously signi￿cant partial e⁄ects: the panel time-
speci￿c e⁄ects capture the ￿rst-order impact of time-variation in aggregate
variables. Equally, as long as the regional characteristics are time-invariant,
their ￿rst-order e⁄ects will be fully captured by the state ￿xed-e⁄ects. The
only uninteracted elements of zk
t we therefore need to control for in this
speci￿cation are the time- and state speci￿c variables y0k
t .3
4 Results
4.1 Cyclical patterns of Interstate consumption risk sharing
Our ￿rst set of results is presented in table 1. Here we run the decomposition
(4) above by parametrizing
￿X(t) = ￿0X + ￿1X￿gdpt (7)
where ￿gdpt is aggregate GDP growth. Con￿rming the intuition provided in
￿gure (1), we ￿nd that consumption risk sharing increases in booms and de-
creases in recessions (i.e. ￿U(t) is countercyclical). Interestingly, the income
and consumption smoothing channels have opposite cyclical dependence on
GDP; whereas income smoothing decreases in booms and increases in re-
cessions, the opposite is true for both ￿scal transfers and in particularly
consumption smoothing. Consumption smoothing decreases in recessions,
whereas it improves in booms. This latter e⁄ect dominates the positive ef-
3In particular, the state-level banking deregulation dummy we use below will be of this
latter form.
14fect of recessions on income smoothing (and is further reinforced through
the ￿scal channel) so that the total extent of risk sharing, as measured by
1 ￿ ￿U(t), is strongly procyclical.
These results are robust to alternative measures of the business cycle.
In panel B, we capture the business cycle using the o¢ cial NBER recession
and expansion dates. We also distinguish between recessions and booms to
check for the possibility of asymmetries in the dependence of risk sharing
on the cycle. There is no sign of such asymmetries: the coe¢ cients on
the expansion and recession indicators are virtually of the same order of
magnitude and all correctly signed throughout and ￿with the sole but only
marginal exception of the expansion indicator in the regression for ￿U ￿also
highly signi￿cant.4
Turning to the pattern of risk sharing, we see that the main source of
procyclicality in risk sharing is consumption smoothing ￿our estimate of
￿C(t) is strongly procyclical and highly signi￿cant.
This procyclicality in consumption smoothing is partly o⁄set by income
smoothing (￿I(t)) which decreases in booms and rises in recessions. A similar
pattern has also been observed by Agronin (2003) who also pointed at the
possibility that an explanation for this feature might be purely mechanical:
the share of small business owners￿ income (proprietary income) in U.S.
output is strongly procyclical. Since income from small businesses is not
generally disbursed across state boundaries, say through pro￿t or dividend
payments (since the owner of a typical small business is likely to reside in
the state), the share of income that ￿ ows across state borders to provide
income smoothing decreases in booms.5
4Though the point estimates indicate that the reduction of aggregate risk sharing in
recessions is stronger than its rise in booms, we cannot reject the hypothesis ￿1U+￿2U = 0.
Hence, we cannot reject that there are no asymmetries between expansions and recessions.
5This interpretation is supported by the fact that we ￿nd a negative link between
15However, ￿C(t) is much more strongly procyclical than ￿I(t) is anticycli-
cal. The impact on the procyclicality in aggregate risk sharing (1 ￿ ￿U(t))
is further reinforced through the ￿scal channel , even though this e⁄ect is
rather small. Hence, ￿ uctuations in access to consumption smoothing pos-
sibilities given disposable income are the main driver of the variation in
interstate consumption risk sharing over the business cycle.
4.2 Importance of small businesses
We show next that the cyclical pattern of risk sharing that we established
in table 1 is much more pronounced in those states where small ￿rms are
important.
As discussed in the data description, we employ two measures of small
￿rm importance (that we denote by ￿ throughout) in a state: our ￿rst
measure is the share of proprietary income in state personal income (￿1 =
Shapi). This measure has the advantage that it speci￿cally focuses on the
importance of those households that actually own small businesses for the
regional economy.
As an additional measure, we also consider the share of total employment
in small businesses of less than 100 employees (￿2 = SBE). It encompasses a
somewhat di⁄erent concept of small business importance in that it focuses on
the role of small businesses as employers and therefore for the local economy
at large. One drawback of this measure is that state-level time-series for
small business employment are available only from 1977, thus covering only
what is essentially the second half of our sample period.
For both the employment (SBE) and income (Shapi) based measure
we split our sample of states into three equally sized groups according to
income smoothing and the aggregate share of proprietors￿income in GNP once, in analogy
to (7) we parametrize ￿I as a function of this variable.
16whether the importance of small businesses in a given state is high, middle
or low.6 We conduct this sample split based on sample averages for the pro-
prietors￿income measure, whereas we use the earliest available observation
(1977) for the employment-based measure of small-business importance. 7
We then rerun the regression speci￿cation (7) for the unsmoothed com-
ponent , ￿U(t), on each of these groups. The results are in panel A of table
2: as is apparent, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between aggregate
GDP, ￿gdpt, and the growth of gross state product, ￿^ gspk;t, is highly sig-
ni￿cant and negative for those states where small businesses are important.
For the other two groups of states, aggregate risk sharing does not seem
to covary strongly with the business cycle. As is apparent, the results are
qualitatively the same, irrespective of whether we use the income- or the
employment-based measure of small business importance.8
6These groups, to which we refer as high-, middle- and low-￿ groups, are detailed in
table A1 in the appendix.
7We checked that it is indeed the cross-sectional dispersion (and not time variation)
in ￿
k that drives the results. First, we also ran most of our speci￿cations with the time-
averages of ￿1 = Shapi taken over the ￿rst or the second half of the sample only. Secondly,
we parametrized many of the regressions below in a way that allows ￿1 to vary across both
time and state. All results reported in the paper were robust to these changes. For the
employment-based measure, we focus on the earliest available observation for two reasons.
First, because our argument below is going to be that the dependence of aggregate risk
sharing on the business cycle (and the role of small business importance for the strength
of this dependence) is going to be weaker after the deregulation wave of the mid 1980s.
Secondly, the recession of the early 1980s has had a major impact on the ranking of some
big states in terms of small business importance. Still, most of our results based on SBE
would be the same if we used averages instead of the earliest observation.
8The coe¢ cient ￿U0 may decline as we move from the low to the high ￿-group but this
does not necessarily mean that the high ￿ group shares more risk on average. The reason
for this variation in ￿0U between the groups is mainly mechanical: We could equivalently




1U(￿gdpt ￿ ￿gdp) where ￿gdp is the sample







1U￿gdp is the average amount of risk shared by group
i. It is apparent that the group with the higher business cycle sensitivity (lower ￿
i
1U) of
risk sharing will necessarily have a lower ￿
i
0U if the average amount of risk shared, ￿
i
0U,
does not vary across groups. We do not report the speci￿cation with demeaned ￿gdp
mainly because this would in turn make the interpretation of the coe¢ cients on interactions
involving ￿gdp as we will consider them in the remainder of the paper considerably less
intuitive. We explore in the next speci￿cation if there are systematic di⁄erences in the
17We then explore to what extent the entire pattern of risk sharing is
sensitive to the aggregate business cycle. We do so by parametrizing ￿X(t)
as a function of the share of proprietary income in state personal income:











1 is the sample average of the share of proprietary income for state
k and ￿1 the cross-sectional mean of ￿k
1. Panel B of table 2 presents the
results for this speci￿cation. Again it is clearly apparent that the cyclical
dependence of interstate risk sharing overall (￿U(t)) is more pronounced
where small ￿rms account for a large share of state income. Inspecting the
patterns of risk sharing, we see that this feature can primarily be explained
by the fact that the consumption smoothing channel, ￿C(t), is particularly
procyclical in states where ￿1 is high.
These ￿ndings suggests that small ￿rms play an important role in ex-
plaining why aggregate risk sharing ￿ uctuates over the business cycle. It is,
however, conceivable, that the time variation in these ￿rms￿access to ￿nance
is not mainly the result of them being rather small, but rather the outcome
of these ￿rms being concentrated in particular sectors of the economy.
We address this issue in table 3, where we repeat our regressions for
￿U(t), but now we also include a number of controls. Speci￿cally, we capture






















extent to which the three groups share risk on average.
18where GSPs
k=GSPk is the share of value added in sector s in the total value
added of state k. In our regressions, we use the estimates of ISk provided
in table (1) of Kalemli-Ozcan, Słrensen and Yosha (2001) for both the one
and the two digit industry classi￿cation levels. In our speci￿cation for ￿U(t)
we then also include both IS and its interaction with ￿gdp. In several
of the regressions reported in table 3 we also include a linear trend in the
speci￿cation for ￿U(t) to control for the e⁄ect of other, gradual developments
that could have a⁄ected interstate risk sharing over the sample period.
In addition, we estimate some of the speci￿cations in table 3 by GLS to
account for potential heteroskedasticity in the data. We ￿rst estimate the
respective equation for the entire panel by OLS. Then we use the residuals to
estimate the residual variance for each state. In a second step, we correct for
heteroskedasticity by weighting observations with the inverse of this state-
speci￿c variance. This never a⁄ects our results and here and elsewhere in
the paper we mainly report the results for panel OLS which gives slightly
higher weight to smaller states.
The results in table 3 clearly show that industrial structure matters both
for the degree of interregional risk sharing as well as for its cyclical depen-
dence. More specialized regions tend to be better insured, a stylized fact
￿rst established by Kalemli-Ozcan, Słrensen and Yosha (2001, 2003). It
also appears to be the case that more specialized regions tend to be exposed
more to cyclical variation in risk sharing, even though this result appears
less pronounced in the generalized least squares regressions. Controlling for
industrial structure does, however, not a⁄ect our ￿ndings that small busi-
nesses are paramount in explaining why aggregate risk sharing ￿ uctuates
over the cycle. We therefore conclude that it is not mainly industrial struc-
ture but the incidence of small ￿rms itself that can account for the patterns
19we have documented in this subsection.
4.3 The role of banking deregulation
Our maintained hypothesis is that small ￿rms￿access to credit markets, par-
ticularly to bank loans, is a key determinant of the extent to which interstate
risk sharing ￿ uctuates over the aggregate business cycle. A major develop-
ment that could have a⁄ected the availability of credit to small ￿rms in our
sample period is the gradual deregulation of the U.S. banking market dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s. Until that time, the U.S. had a highly fragmented,
localized banking system. State regulation generally prohibited the opera-
tion of out-of-state banks and also strongly limited bank branching within a
state, to the point that in some states banks where allowed to operate only
a single branch.9 From the point of view of economic theory, one would
expect that the gradual lifting of this regulation would lead to considerable
welfare gains through the formation of bigger banks and a better inter- and
intrastate pooling of credit risk. Indeed, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show
that federal states that deregulated their banking markets earlier did even-
tually grow faster. They ascribe much of this growth gain to better access
of small ￿rms￿to credit. Morgan et al. (2004) ￿nd that deregulation has
lowered the volatility of U.S. state business cycles. In a recent important
contribution, Demyanyk et al. (2007) demonstrate that income risk sharing
increased due to state-level banking deregulation and they also show that
this increase was more pronounced in states where there are lots of small
businesses. While our paper is related to Demyanyk et al.￿ s, our analysis
di⁄ers in scope in that we focus on the role of proprietary businesses and
9See Kroszner and Strahan (1999) for a succinct overview of the historical origins of
this regulation and for a detailed account of of the political and economic determinants
of deregulation.
20state-level banking deregulation for business cycle variability in risk sharing
rather than on the e⁄ect of deregulation on the average level of risk sharing.
Speci￿cally, we investigate to what extent banking deregulation has steadied
interstate risk sharing by improving small ￿rms￿access to ￿nance.
The literature has distinguished between two dimension of state-level
deregulation: intrastate deregulation removed branching and merger restric-
tions for banks and bank holding companies that were domiciled in a state.
Interstate deregulation allowed access to the local market by out-of state
banks and bank holding companies (often on a reciprocal basis) thus mak-
ing the interstate pooling of bank funds possible.
As we show in the next subsection, it was intrastate deregulation that has
a⁄ected the cyclical pattern of risk sharing whereas interstate deregulation
had virtually no e⁄ect in this respect. Unless otherwise mentioned, our focus
in this paper is therefore on intrastate deregulation.
To exploit both the cross-sectional and intertemporal dimensions of dereg-
ulation we use a dummy variable SDDk
t which becomes one from the year
in which deregulation took place in state k. Following the practice of Ja-
yaratne and Strahan (1996), Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Demyanyk
et al. (2007), we de￿ne the date of intrastate deregulation as the year in
which state-wide branching through mergers and acquisitions was fully per-
mitted. Deregulation dates are from Kroszner and Strahan (1999) for the
years 1978-2001 and Amel (1993) for the years prior to 1978.
In table 4, we explore if intrastate banking deregulation has had an
impact on the pattern of risk sharing and the degree to which it varies over
the business cycle. In panel A, we ￿rst introduce the dummy SDDk
t to allow
for a state-speci￿c impact on the longer term average level of risk sharing.
Doing so leaves our conclusions with respect to the cyclical ￿ uctuation in
21the pattern of risk sharing una⁄ected; the point estimates on the ￿gdp-term
for all channels as well as for the unsmoothed component remain virtually
unchanged and highly signi￿cant.
Quite in line with Demyanyk et al. (2007), we ￿nd a sizeable positive
level e⁄ect of banking deregulation on the average level of income smoothing:
deregulation leads to between 15 and 20 percentage points more risk sharing
through the income channel. Interestingly, however, we also ￿nd that dereg-
ulation lowers the average amount of consumption smoothing by roughly
the same, so that the net e⁄ect of banking deregulation on ￿U(t) appears
insigni￿cant. This would seem to suggest that banking deregulation has had
a pronounced e⁄ect on the patterns of income and consumption smoothing
but less so on the total extent to which consumption risk is shared across
state boundaries.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this shift in the pattern of
risk sharing in detail.10 But while this impact on the patterns of risk sharing
clearly seems very marked, deregulation seems to have had a rather small
e⁄ect on the average level of consumption risk sharing. Our argument here is
that banking deregulation has still had an economically very important e⁄ect
on consumption risk sharing by weakening its variability over the business
cycle.
Table 4, panel B shows the impact of banking deregulation on the cyclical
pattern of risk sharing. Here, we report on a speci￿cation which allows the
sensitivity of ￿k
X(t) to GDP growth to change after banking deregulation:
10One possible explanation could be provided by the creation of the S-corporation in
the early 1980s. The S-corporation, though being a legal entity, is tax exempt. Only
pro￿ts disbursed to shareholders are taxed as personal income (statistically they are then
registered as proprietary income). In a progressive tax system, this could create a tax
incentive to smooth the disbursement of pro￿ts, provided the ￿rm can bu⁄er ￿ uctuations
in cash ￿ ow through access to credit markets. Clearly, we would expect the latter to have
become easier in the wake of deregulation.
22￿k
X(t) = ￿X0 + ￿X1￿gdpt + ￿X2￿gdptSDDk
t + ￿X3SDDk
t (8)
For both the income and the consumption smoothing, the coe¢ cients ￿1
and ￿2 have opposite sign and are highly signi￿cant. In both cases, we accept
the hypothesis ￿1 +￿2 = 0 at very high signi￿cance levels. This also carries
over to ￿U(t). Here, again, we cannot reject ￿U1 + ￿U2 = 0. These ￿ndings
suggest that banking deregulation has eliminated almost all of the business-
cycle dependence of aggregate risk sharing. In any case deregulation seems
to have contributed substantially to weakening this dependence.
As our previous results suggest, this business cycle dependence used to
be particularly pronounced in states where small businesses are particularly
prevalent. Hence, if banking deregulation has almost eliminated the de-
pendence of risk sharing on the state of the business cycle, then it would
seem that its e⁄ect should have been strongest in states with lots of small
businesses. We explore this possibility next.
Table 5 presents regressions in which ￿U is again parametrized as a
function of GDP growth:
￿U(t) = ￿0U + ￿1￿gdpt
As in table 2, the regressions reported in panel A of table 5 are performed on
subsamples formed according to the importance of small businesses. Again,
we refer to these groups as high-, middle-, and low-￿ groups respectively. In
addition, we split the sample into an early period (1963-1983) and a later pe-
riod (1986-1998). The early period is characterized by gradual deregulation.
While in 1963 only relatively few states (roundabout 25%) had deregulated,
roughly 45% had done so by 1983. The second period starts with the wave
23of deregulations of the mid-late 1980s.11
If banking deregulation has had an impact on the cyclical variability to
which risk can be shared over the cycle mainly through its e⁄ect on small
businesses we would expect that the business cycle sensitivity of risk sharing
would have decreased mainly in the ￿ high-￿￿states. This is exactly what we
see: in the early part of the sample, the high-￿ group is strongly exposed
to ￿ uctuations in GDP whereas the low- and middle-￿ groups are not. But
in the later sub-sample, risk sharing does not longer depend on GDP, even
for the high-￿ group. Again, this pattern holds for both the income and the
employment-based measures of small business importance.
In principle it is conceivable that this pattern could be driven by other
developments that coincided with the deregulation of bank branching restric-
tions. Not so: to show that it is indeed the impact of banking deregulation
that drives these results, we run the same regressions as in panel A for the
￿rst subperiod, i.e. 1963-83, but now we sort states into four categories:
above/below median small business importance (high/low ￿) and whether
the state had deregulated by 1983 or not (late/early deregulation). Results
are in panel B of table 5. As is clearly apparent, risk sharing by small busi-
ness intensive states was signi￿cantly exposed to ￿ uctuations in GDP ( as
indicated by ￿1U) only in those states that were late deregulators . For all
other groups, in particular for the high ￿/ early deregulation group, there
is no signi￿cant link of ￿U with aggregate GDP. Again, this is true for both
measures of small business importance.
11Between 1985 and 1988, 16 states abolished intrastate M&A and branching restric-
tions. We exclude the years 1984 and 1985 from the sample so as to make sure that most
states had actually liberalized for most of the second sample period.
244.4 Intra- vs. interstate banking deregulation
The measure of deregulation we use in our analysis is the date of intrastate
deregulation of banking services in a given state. Here, we examine whether
this focus is justi￿ed: we compare to what extent intra- or interstate dereg-
ulation respectively have contributed to the shifting patterns of interstate
risk sharing and, in particular, to what extent the two forms of deregulation
have changed the variability of risk sharing over the cycle.
Table 6 displays results for each deregulation measure separately and
for both measures together including both long-term (average level) and
business-cycle e⁄ects on risk sharing. It is apparent that whilst interstate
deregulation has mainly a⁄ected the average level of income and consump-
tion smoothing, only intrastate deregulation has had a signi￿cant impact
on the variability of risk sharing over the cycle. Again, this is true for all
individual channels as it is for aggregate risk sharing, 1 ￿ ￿U(t). We think
that these results have a highly intuitive interpretation: We would expect
that longer-term improvements in interstate risk sharing for the average
household can only be brought about by better access to credit from out-
of-state. Allowing the formation of banks that operate and provide credit
across state borders was exactly a key feature of interstate deregulation.
Intrastate deregulation, on the other hand, has permitted banks to branch
into other counties within the same state which is likely to have led to a
cross-county, state-wide diversi￿cation of banks￿credit risks. Such better
pooling of credit risks may in turn have allowed to extend lines of credit to
certain household groups and in particular to small ￿rms whose cash ￿ ows
and collateral value are highly correlated with local (county-speci￿c) eco-
nomic conditions. In particular, such a development may have improved
small ￿rms￿ability to smooth consumption and income, in particular in ag-
25gregate cyclical downturns, when collateral values are low. Our results in
this respect clearly tie in with the ￿ndings of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996),
Morgan et al. (2004) and Demyanyk et al. (2007) who also ascribe the im-
portance of deregulation for small businesses rather to the intrastate than
to the interstate dimension.
4.5 Extensions and robustness
4.5.1 Risk sharing, asset prices and collateral constraints
As both an extension and robustness check we examine to what extent our
results concerning the ￿ uctuation of risk sharing with aggregate GDP could
actually be driven by ￿ uctuations in asset prices. Asset prices are highly cor-
related with the business cycle and the relation between ￿U(t) and aggregate
GDP growth could just re￿ ect what is actually a direct e⁄ect of asset prices
on risk sharing. There are at least two channels through which asset prices
could account for time-variation in the extent to which risk can be shared
across state borders. First, asset prices ￿ uctuations a⁄ect the value of col-
lateral and may therefore have an impact on credit market access. Secondly,
asset price ￿ uctuations, in particular of stock prices, could a⁄ect risk shar-
ing over the cycle because they directly change the degree of interregional
portfolio diversi￿cation: household holdings of the national stock market
(e.g. through retirement savings plans) represent a claim to output in other
federal states so that stock ownership brings interregional diversi￿cation.12
When stock prices rise, the value of this diversi￿ed component of wealth in-
creases relative to that of interregionally non-diversi￿able components, such
12This is certainly true if a household holds a diversi￿ed claim on the entire national
stock market portfolio. But it is also possible if the household holds shares only of a
limited number of companies. Provided these companies have operations outside the state
of residence of the household, their stock is likely to represent claims to pro￿ts from many
di⁄erent federal states, thus providing interstate diversi￿cation to the household.
26as labour income, housing or proprietary wealth. Therefore, interstate risk
sharing could ￿ uctuate with stock market valuations.
To assess to what extent our results interact with time variation in col-
lateral values, we turn to the recent study by Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh
(2006) who have argued that the availability of housing collateral constrains
interstate risk sharing in the United States. Possibly, the availability of hous-
ing collateral could also help explain why risk sharing ￿ uctuates with aggre-
gate GDP. In addition, given that small businesses face high non-insurable
risk and may therefore face particularly severe credit constraints, the avail-
ability of housing collateral may be especially important for small business
owners for whom personal and business ￿nance are closely intertwined. To
explore this nexus, we parametrize ￿k
U(t) as a function not only of ￿gdpt but
also Lustig￿ s and van Nieuwerburgh￿ s indicator of housing collateral scarcity,
the so-called my-residual13, and of various other controls, including interac-
tions between ￿gdp and ￿, my and ￿, as well as of a linear trend.
Table 7 reveals that the business cycle dependence of risk sharing re-
mains highly signi￿cant in all these speci￿cations. As found by Lustig and
van Nieuwerburgh (2006), housing collateral scarcity clearly matters for risk
sharing, but it cannot explain away the dependence of interstate risk sharing
on aggregate GDP growth. Interestingly, the e⁄ect of collateral scarcity on
risk sharing is ampli￿ed in states with a high share of proprietary income,
the interaction between ￿ and my has a large positive coe¢ cient and is also
signi￿cant in two speci￿cations. Note also that once we consider the interac-
tion of proprietorship with housing collateral scarcity, the aggregate housing
collateral factor alone switches sign and generally ceases to have a signi￿-
13Housing collateral scarcity, myt, is the residual of a cointegrating relationship between
housing wealth and income, rescaled to the interval between zero and one, with unity
indicating highest scarcity (lowest availability of collateral). Further details are given in
the data appendix.
27cant impact on aggregate risk sharing. This result again suggests that small
￿rms￿access to credit seems to be crucial in understanding why risk sharing
￿ uctuates over the business cycle. But the fact that the cyclical dependence
of risk sharing holds up even once we control for a measure of collateral
scarcity also underscores our point that housing collateral constraints are
likely to be only one aspect of the story we focus on here.
Table 8 explores the impact of stock market valuations on interregional
diversi￿cation. To this end, we include a measure of asset price cycles as an
additional interaction term in our regressions. We use Lettau￿ s and Ludvig-
son￿ s (2001) cay -residual, an econometric proxy of the consumption-wealth
ratio that, as Lettau and Ludvigson have shown, is a very good indicator of
the cyclical component in U.S. stock markets. As is apparent from columns
II-IV of table 8, cay indeed helps explain ￿ uctuations in aggregate risk shar-
ing: risk sharing signi￿cantly increases when asset prices are high (cay is
low) and decreases, when asset prices are low (cay is high). We think this
is an interesting result in its own right, though we do not aim to explore it
further in this paper. Again, the inclusion of cay does not change our results
with respect to the variation of risk sharing as a function of aggregate GDP,
though. Another interesting feature that is noteworthy from Table 8 is that
the interaction of ￿GDP with a deregulation trend variable, CumDt ￿the
cumulative fraction of states that had deregulated at a given date ￿is gen-
erally positive and signi￿cant, once again suggesting that the dependence
of aggregate risk sharing on the GDP-cycle has decreased as deregulation
has progressed. Interestingly enough, this very same trend does not seem
to have changed the role of asset prices for ￿ uctuations in risk sharing ￿the
interaction between CumDt and cayt is insigni￿cant.
284.5.2 Monte Carlo evidence
In this ￿nal subsection, we illustrate the robustness of our main results fur-
ther by way of a Monte Carlo simulation: ￿rst, interstate risk sharing ￿ uctu-
ates more with the aggregate business cycle in states where small businesses
account for a large share of economic activity. Secondly, intrastate bank
branching deregulation has considerably weakened this business cycle de-
pendence of risk sharing, presumably through its impact on small business
access to ￿nance. We ask whether the speci￿c incidence of small businesses
in a state and the speci￿c date at which intrastate deregulation took place
have a direct bearing on our results or whether these results could have been
obtained by chance e.g. because they are driven by other developments that
more or less coincided with the unfolding of deregulation across time and
states.14
We follow Aghion et al. (2008) and randomly assign ￿ placebo￿measures
of small business importance (￿k) and deregulation dates (SDDk
t ) to each
state by sampling 1000 draws from the empirical distribution of these vari-
ables. For both small business importance and deregulation dates, we then
run two di⁄erent exercises: in the ￿rst exercise, we run our speci￿cation on
the placebo variable alone, asking in what percentage of cases it is more
signi￿cant than the true variable. In the second exercise, we include both
the placebo and the actual variable and we investigate in how many of our
simulations the placebo and the actual variable respectively are individually
signi￿cant.
Panel A illustrates that the strength of the cyclical variation in ￿U(t)
depends on small business prevalence. As is apparent, the interaction be-
tween the placebo measure of ￿1 (the share of proprietary income in state
14We thank Fabrizio Zilibotti for suggesting this exercise
29personal income) and aggregate GDP growth is more signi￿cant than in the
real data in less than 3 percent of all cases. Conversely, if both the placebo
and the actual measure are included, the interaction between GDP and the
real measure is always signi￿cant, whereas it is only signi￿cant in around 10
percent of all cases for the placebo.
Panel B gives the corresponding results for intrastate deregulation: the
interaction between the placebo deregulation date and aggregate GDP growth
is more signi￿cant than between GDP and the real deregulation date in just
10 percent of cases. If the interactions of GDP with both the true and the
placebo deregulation date are included, the coe¢ cient on the true interac-
tion is signi￿cant in 84 percent of all simulations, but only in 12 percent
for the placebos. Note also that SDD when not interacted with GDP, is
almost never signi￿cant and only 12 percent of the placebo draws in the
placebo-only speci￿cation would yield a t-statistics that is higher than the
(insigni￿cant) t-statistics on the true deregulation date. This once again
highlights the relative importance of deregulation for the variability of in-
terstate risk sharing: whereas, as we have seen above, deregulation seems
to have had a major e⁄ect on the patterns of risk sharing (more income
smoothing, as shown by Demyanyk et al. (2007) but also less consumption
smoothing), its impact on the average level of aggregate consumption risk
sharing appears insigni￿cant. In as far as consumption risk sharing is con-
cerned, the main impact of deregulation seems to have been to make risk
sharing less variable over the business cycle.
The simulations in Panel C further illustrate that it is truly the inter-
action between small business importance and intrastate bank deregulation
that is responsible for the reduced variability of risk sharing. Here, we sam-
30ple from the joint distribution of ￿ and SDD.15 We then repeat the exercise
from table 5, panel B: based on their placebo assignments, we sort all states
into four groups: high/low ￿ and early/late deregulation. The estimation
period is again 1963-83. For the high-￿/late deregulation group we report
the percentage of cases in which the respective coe¢ cients are signi￿cant
and correctly signed. As is apparent the coe¢ cients is almost never signi￿-
cant when based on the placebo: in only 0.3% and 0.2% of all cases for the
income and employment based measures respectively. This underscores that
business cycle ￿ uctuations in a state￿ s ability to share risk with other states
are clearly not random but explained by the interaction of the two particular
characteristics we focus on: the prevalence of small businesses and whether
a state had deregulated its banking market or not.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we establish that interstate risk sharing in the United States
varies over the business cycle, with risk sharing increasing in booms and
decreasing during downturns. This variation in aggregate risk sharing is
quantitatively important. Over our sample period, the average state would
share almost 80 percent of its business cycle risk with other states. But every
percentage point increase in US-wide GDP growth increases interstate risk
sharing by almost four percentage points and in the trough of the average
recession in our sample period, risk sharing was 17% percentage points below
its mean.
There is also a distinct pattern in how risk is shared over the business
15As shown in Kroszner and Strahan (1999), deregulation did not occur randomly.
Rather, states whith lots of small businesses tended to deregulate earlier. To account for
this correlation, we do not draw ￿ and SDD independently but from their joint distribu-
tion.
31cycle. Interestingly, we ￿nd that income smoothing through capital income
￿ ows is hugely countercyclical, whereas consumption smoothing through
savings and dissavings at the household level is strongly procyclical. It is the
latter e⁄ect that dominates, so that aggregate risk sharing is also strongly
procyclical.
We argue that these patterns of risk sharing are determined by time-
variation in the ability of small ￿rms to obtain credit. First, we demonstrate
that the business cycle dependence of risk sharing is much more pronounced
in states where small ￿rms are particularly prevalent. Secondly, we show
that the liberalization of state-level bank branching and holding legislation
in the U.S. has hugely a⁄ected this pattern: banking deregulation virtually
removed the dependence of aggregate risk sharing on the business cycle and
this reduction in cyclical dependence occurred primarily in states where
small businesses account for a large share of income or employment.
At a theoretical level, banking deregulation may a⁄ect risk sharing in two
ways: better interstate pooling of credit risk may lead to more risk sharing
on average. Secondly, if ￿rms and households face collateral and borrowing
constraints, the extent to which consumption risk sharing is possible may
be sensitive to the phase of the business cycle. Our results suggest that
this second e⁄ect is particularly important: banking deregulation seems to
have improved credit market access for small ￿rms most when it is also most
needed ￿in cyclical downturns.
326 Data appendix
Gross State Product (GSP). Gross State Product is de￿ned as the
"value added" of the industries of a state. Data for gross state product are
available from the BEA. GSP (as all our data) is divided by state-by-state
population.
State Income (SI). State income is de￿ned as the sum of earnings
(wages and proprietors￿income), distributed pro￿ts (including interest and
rent) of residents of the state and state and federal non-personal taxes (in-
cluding corporate taxes and indirect business taxes). We construct it fol-
lowing Asdrubali et al. (1996) as the sum of state personal income, federal
nonpersonal taxes and contributions, state and local nopersonal taxes, in-
terest on state and local funds less direct transfers (federal and state). State
personal income is available from the BEA and is de￿ned as income that is re-
ceived by, or on behalf of, persons who live in the state. It is calculated as the
sum of wage and salary disbursements, supplements to wages and salaries,
proprietors￿income with inventory valuation adjustment and private capital
consumption adjustment (CCAdj), rental income of persons with CCAdj,
personal dividend income, personal interest income, and personal current
transfer receipts, less contributions for government social insurance.
Disposable State Income (DSI). Disposable income is de￿ned as
state income plus federal transfers to individuals and federal grants to state
governments minus federal non-personal taxes and contributions and federal
personal taxes. Federal grants are provided by the United States Statistical
Abstract, federal personal taxes and transfers are available by state from
the BEA.
State Consumption (C). State consumption is de￿ned as the sum
of private consumption and consumption by the state government. Private
consumption at the state level is not available. We follow Asdrubali et al.
(1996) and the extant literature and construct private consumption as retail
sales re-scaled by the ratio of aggregate US private consumption to aggregate
US retail sales.
Share of Proprietary Income (Shapi). We calculate the share of
proprietary income as the ratio of state proprietary income to state per-
sonal income. The both data for personal and proprietary income are from
the BEA. Proprietary income is de￿ned by the BEA as current-production
income of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and tax-exempt cooperatives.
It excludes dividends, monetary interest received by non￿nancial business,
and rental income received by persons not primarily engaged in the real
estate business. A sole proprietorship is an unincorporated business owned
by a person; a partnership is an unincorporated business association of two
or more partners; a tax-exempt cooperative is a non-pro￿t business organi-
33zation that is collectively owned by its customer-members16.
Small Business Employment (SBEk). Small businesses are estab-
lishments with a number of employees less than 100. We measure small
business employment as number of people employed in small business es-
tablishments relative to total employment in a state in 1977, the earliest
date available. The data is available from Geospatial and Statistical Data
Center, University of Virginia library.
Gross Domestic Product (GDPt). Gross domestic product is con-
structed as sum of gross states products (not per capita) over all states for
every time period t divided by total US population.
NBER Indicators. The data are from NBER Business Cycle Dates
(http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). NBERpeakt dummy equals one, when
business cycle reaches peak, otherwise it is zero. NBERtrought dummy
equals one, when business cycle reaches it￿ s trough, otherwise it is zero.
Deregulation (SDDk;t). We use data on banking deregulation from
Demyanyk et al. (2007), Table 1. A deregulation dummy becomes one from
the year where intrastate deregulation took place. We measure the e⁄ect
of intrastate branching deregulation using dummy variable SDDk;t, that
switches on (from 0 to 1) the year state k permitted statewide branching by
merges and acquisitions and stays on thereafter. We generally use intrastate
deregulation dummy. The interstate deregulation indicator switches on the
year state k permits entry by out-of-state banks and stays on thereafter.
Deregulation dates are from Kroszner and Strahan (1999) for the years 1978-
2001 and Amel (1993) for the years prior to 1978. Since the actual date of




k ). We measure industrial structure using
the sectoral specialization index constructed by Kalemli-Ozcan, Słrensen
and Yosha (2001) for both the one and the two digit industry classi￿cation
















is the share of value added in sector s in the total value added of state k.
Housing Collateral Ratio (myt). We follow Lustig and van Nieuwer-
burgh (2005, 2006) and estimate the housing collateral ratio myt as the devi-
ation from the cointegrating relationship myt = log(ht)+ b $log(yt)+b ￿t+ b ￿,
where ht is housing wealth measured by real estate wealth, yt is labor in-
come plus transfers, t is time trend, and b ￿ is a constant. Then we remove
a constant and a trend, so that the resulting time series myt are mean zero
and stationary, according to an ADF test. The housing collateral ratio is
16The national estimates of the income of non-farm proprietorships are based on tab-
ulations of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax returns. According to tax law IRS does
not distinguish between general partnerships, limited partnerships and limited liability
companies and, hence, owners of partnerships and LLCs report their business income or
losses on their individual tax returns. That is why proprietary income does include income
from LLCs .
34rescaled so that it lies between 0 and 1 and measures collateral scarcity:
myt =
mymax￿myt
mymax￿mymin, where mymax and mymin are the maximum and mini-
mum observation in the respective samples.
Consumption-Wealth Ratio (cayt). As a measure of asset price cy-
cles we use cay, the residual of a cointegrating relationship between aggre-
gate consumption, asset wealth and labor income. Details are in Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001). The data are freely available at Martin Lettau￿ s home
page (http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/lettau/). We take annual averages to
convert quarterly into annual data.
Population (popk
t). The data for state population are from the BEA.
Consumption Price Index (cpit). We use the PCE to de￿ ate all
nominal variables.
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37Table 1: Risk Sharing and the Business Cycle.
Table reports the results of the panel OLS regressions (4). ￿￿(t) are de￿ned as speci￿ed
in the panel heading. The dot ￿ stands for I;F;C;U. Constants are not reported.
The data are annual from 1963 to 1998. T-statistics are in parentheses. Signi￿cance at
the 10% (5%) level is indicated by ￿ (￿￿).
( I ) ( F ) ( C ) ( U )
Panel A: ￿￿(t) = ￿0￿ + ￿1￿￿gdpt
￿0￿ 0.5802** 0.0310** 0.1732** 0.2156**
(46.7801 ) (3.0251 ) (5.6453 ) (7.6592 )
￿1￿ -3.3473** 1.0826** 6.4711** -4.2063**
(-8.2816 ) (3.2455 ) (6.4735 ) (-4.5853 )
Panel B: ￿￿(t) = ￿0￿ + ￿1￿NBERpeakt + ￿2￿NBERtrought
￿0￿ 0.5354** 0.0775** 0.2404** 0.1467**
(38.9674 ) (6.9792 ) (7.1569 ) (4.7666 )
￿1￿ -0.0598** -0.1030** 0.2760** -0.1133*
(-2.2522 ) (-4.8053 ) (4.2553 ) (-1.9075 )
￿2￿ 0.0530* -0.0282 -0.1911** 0.1663**
(1.9308 ) (-1.2724 ) (-2.8490 ) (2.7076 )
38Table 2: Risk Sharing and Small Businesses




￿U(t) is de￿ned as ￿U= ￿0U+￿1U￿gdpt. The states are split according to the measure of small
business importance ("low", "middle", "high") ￿k.
Panel B reports the results of the panel OLS regressions (4) where ￿k
￿ (t) is speci￿ed as de￿ned in
the panel heading. ￿k denotes time-series means of the share of proprietary income for every state k
and ￿k is the cross-sectional mean of ￿k.
Constants are not reported. The dot ￿ stands for I;F;C;U. The data are annual from 1963 to 1998.
T-statistics are in parentheses. Signi￿cance at the 10% (5%) level is indicated by ￿ (￿￿).
Panel A
low ￿k middle ￿k high ￿k
￿k = Shapi (Share of proprietary income)
￿0U 0.4142** 0.2014** 0.3043**
(5.5631 ) (6.0781 ) (4.3639 )
￿1U -2.4910 -1.1571 -8.3408**
(-1.0301 ) (-0.9328 ) (-4.4062 )
￿k = SBE (Small Business Employment in 1977)
￿0U 0.3877** 0.2138** 0.1425**
(4.7905 ) (3.4517 ) (3.6182 )
￿1U -2.7020 -0.5194 -4.2800**
(-1.1028 ) (-0.2438 ) (-3.3053 )
Panel B
￿k
￿ (t) = ￿0￿ + ￿1￿￿gdpt + ￿2￿￿gdpt(￿k ￿ ￿) + ￿3￿(￿k ￿ ￿)
(I ) (F) (C ) (U )
￿0￿ 0.6005** 0.0293** 0.1443** 0.2259**
(51.8880 ) (2.8459 ) (4.7916 ) (8.0215 )
￿1￿ -1.4684** 0.9918** 3.0979** -2.6212**
(-3.6463 ) (2.7706 ) (2.9551 ) (-2.6745 )
￿2￿ -4.1307 -8.1140 94.5434** -82.2987**
(-0.4131 ) (0.9130 ) (3.6325 ) (-3.3822 )
￿3￿ -4.5131** 0.6519* 3.5562** 0.3050
(-11.7357 ) (1.9072 ) (3.5525 ) (0.3259 )
39Table 3: Risk Sharing, Proprietary Income and Industrial Structure




k;t. ￿U is de￿ned as
￿k
U(t) = ￿U0 + ￿0
U1zk
t, where zk
t contains the aggregate and state characteristics listed in the ￿rst column. IS
1d;2d
k are 1- or 2-digit
specialization indices. ￿k
1 denotes time-series means of the share of proprietary income for every state k. Constants are not reported.
The data are annual from 1963 to 1998. T-statistics are in parentheses. Signi￿cance at the10% (5%) level is indicated by ￿ (￿￿).
zk
t ( I ) ( II ) ( III ) ( IV ) ( V ) ( VI ) ( VII ) ( VIII )
￿0U 0.40** 0.41** 0.51** 0.54** 0.41** 0.44** 0.44** 0.55**
(3.75) (3.43) (4.31) (4.54) (3.82) (3.87) (3.86) (4.54)
￿gdpt 3.73 3.92 2.60 0.10 2.63 2.36 2.09 -0.05
(1.38) (1.44) (0.86) (0.03) (0.83) (0.76) (0.67) (-0.02)
￿gdpt￿￿k -77.71** -76.12** -76.12** -67.95** -74.36** -76.67** -70.71** -63.35**
(-3.27) (-3.19) (-2.58) (-2.28) (-3.06) (-2.59) (-2.34) (-2.10)
IS1d
k -0.02** -0.02** -0.03** -0.03**
(-4.24) (-4.22) (-2.91) (-2.92)
IS2d
k -0.01** -0.01** -0.02** -0.02**
(-2.88) (-3.52) (-3.80) (-3.81)
￿gdpt￿IS1d





￿k -0.28 -0.58 -0.67 -0.80 -0.31 -0.16 -0.24 -0.88
(-0.30) (-0.60) (-0.58) (-0.70) (-0.33) (-0.14) (-0.21) (-0.76)
Trend no no no no no no yes yes
Method OLS OLS GLS GLS OLS GLS GLS GLS
4
0Table 4: Risk Sharing, Banking Deregulation and the Business Cycle
Table reports the results of the panel OLS regressions
￿g gspk;t ￿ ￿f inck;t = ￿I + ￿k






￿f inck;t ￿ ￿ g dinck;t = ￿F + ￿k






￿ g dinck;t ￿ ￿e ck;t = ￿C + ￿k






￿e ck;t = ￿U + ￿k







t is intrastate deregulation dummy, it becomes 1 from the year of the k￿ s state intrastate deregulation.
The ￿k
￿ (t) are speci￿ed as de￿ned in the panel heading. The dot ￿ stands for I;F;C;U. Constants and ￿￿
d
are not reported.The data are annual from 1963 to 1998. T-statistics in parentheses. Signi￿cance at the 10%
(5%) level is indicated by ￿ (￿￿).
( I ) ( F ) ( C ) ( U )
Panel A: ￿k
￿ (t) = ￿0￿ + ￿1￿SDDk
t + ￿2￿￿gdpt
￿0￿ 0.4607** 0.0756** 0.2600** 0.2037**
(25.3404 ) (4.9552 ) (5.6681 ) (4.8316 )
￿1￿ 0.1952** -0.0727** -0.1403** 0.0177
(8.8712 ) (-3.9316 ) (-2.5261 ) (0.3463 )
￿2￿ -3.0152** 0.9573** 6.2243** -4.1664**
(-7.5839 ) (2.8673 ) (6.2057 ) (-4.5189 )
Panel B: ￿k
￿ (t) = ￿0￿ + ￿1￿￿gdpt + ￿2￿￿gdptSDDk
t + ￿3￿SDDk
t
￿0￿ 0.4900** 0.0859** 0.1777** 0.2464**
(25.1826 ) (5.2384 ) (3.6241 ) (5.4452 )
￿1￿ -4.7046** 0.3647** 10.9683** -6.6284**
(-8.2371 ) (0.7576 ) (7.6208 ) (-4.9902 )
￿2￿ 3.2507** 1.1401 -9.1280** 4.7372**
(4.1030 ) (1.7071 ) (-4.5721 ) (2.5711 )
￿3￿ 0.1471 -0.0896 -0.0050 -0.0525
(5.9165 ) (-4.2736 ) (-0.0798 ) (-0.9085 )
41Table 5: Risk Sharing, Banking Deregulation and Small Businesses
Panel A reports the results of the panel OLS regression ￿e ck;t = ￿U + ￿k





U(t) = ￿0U+￿1U￿gdpt for two periods: pre-1983 and post-1986. The states are split according
to the measure of small business importance ("low", "middle", "high") ￿k.
Panel B reports the results of the panel OLS regression ￿e ck;t = ￿U + ￿k





U(t) as in panel A for the period 1963-83. The states are split into four categories: above/below
median small business importance and whether the state had deregulated by 1983 or not (early/late dere-
gulation). Constants are not reported. T-statistics are in parentheses. Signi￿cance at the10% (5%) level is
indicated by ￿ (￿￿).
Panel A
pre-1983 post-1986
￿k = Shapi (Share of proprietary income)
low ￿k middle ￿k high ￿k low ￿k middle ￿k high ￿k
￿0U 0.3207** 0.1625** 0.2911** 0.4758** 0.1380 0.0354
(3.8767 ) (3.4969 ) (3.5468 ) (2.2676 ) (1.2396 ) (0.2721 )
￿1U 0.0721 -1.3016 -8.5831** 2.5051 0.7495 3.6489
(0.0283 ) (-0.8708 ) (-4.1885 ) (0.4792 ) (0.2781 ) (1.0929 )
￿k = SBE (Small Business Employment)
￿0U 0.3238** 0.1746** 0.1205** 0.4325* 0.2499 0.0463
(3.2162 ) (2.2433 ) (2.5458 ) (2.5537 ) (2.1901 ) (0.4970 )
￿1U -2.1775 -0.7414 -3.9476** 4.1740 2.1845 -2.4978
(-0.7501 ) (-0.3123 ) (-2.9282 ) (0.5704 ) (0.3958 ) (-0.5703 )
Panel B (1963-83)
￿k = Shapi (Share of proprietary income)
early deregulation late deregulation
low ￿k high ￿k low ￿k high ￿k
￿0U 0.0984** 0.0726 0.4323** 0.1529**
(2.0064 ) (0.3643 ) (5.5960 ) (2.5827 )
￿1U -0.1418 0.6289 -1.6523 -6.4791**
(-0.0888 ) (0.1338 ) (-0.6670 ) (-3.9689 )
Nr. obs 300 120 220 380
￿k = SBE (Small Business Employment)
early deregulation late deregulation
low ￿k high ￿k low ￿k high ￿k
￿0U 0.1290 0.1168** 0.3440** 0.1527**
(0.9179 ) (2.0812 ) (4.0015 ) (2.3766 )
￿1U 3.0884 -2.2348 -4.5344* -6.9490**
(0.7840 ) (-1.3417 ) (-1.7376 ) (-3.9273 )
Nr. obs 260 180 240 340
42Table 6: Risk Sharing, Intra- and Interstate Banking Deregulation
Table reports the results of the panel OLS regressions
￿g gspk;t ￿ ￿f inck;t = ￿I + ￿k






￿f inck;t ￿ ￿ g dinck;t = ￿F + ￿k






￿ g dinck;t ￿ ￿e ck;t = ￿C + ￿k






￿e ck;t = ￿U + ￿k








k;t denote intra- and interstate deregulation respectively. The ￿k
￿ (t) are speci￿ed as
de￿ned in the panel heading where the dot ￿ stands for I;F;C; U. Constants and ￿￿
d are not reported. The
data are annual from 1963 to 1998. T-statistics are in parentheses. Signi￿cance at the 10% (5%) level is
indicated by ￿(￿￿).
( I ) ( F ) ( C ) ( U ) ( I ) ( F ) ( C ) ( U )
SDDk;t= SDDIntra
k;t , Intrastate Deregulation SDDk;t= SDDInter
k;t , Interstate Deregulation
￿k
￿ (t)= ￿0￿+￿1￿￿gdpt+￿2￿￿gdpt￿SDDk;t+￿3￿SDDk;t
￿0￿ 0.49** 0.09** 0.18** 0.25** 0.51** 0.03** 0.28** 0.19**
(25.18) (5.24) (3.62) (5.45) (36.58) (2.40) (7.86) (5.83)
￿1￿ -4.71** 0.37 10.97** -6.63** -3.55** 1.11** 6.63** -4.18**
(-8.24) (0.76) (7.62) (-4.99) (-8.55) (3.12) (6.30) (-4.29)
￿2￿ 3.25** 1.14* -9.13** 4.74** 0.12 -0.27 1.01 -0.85
(4.10) (1.71) (-4.57) (2.57) (0.09) (-0.26) (0.32) (-0.29)
￿3￿ 0.15** -0.09** -0.01 -0.05 0.26** 0.01 -0.37** 0.10







( I ) ( F ) ( C ) ( U )
￿0￿ 0.48** 0.08** 0.19** 0.24**
(25.23) (5.13) (3.85) (5.39)
￿1￿ -4.72** 0.36 10.97** -6.61**
(-8.38) (0.76) (7.67) (-4.98)
￿2￿ -1.57 -0.69 5.71* -3.46
(-1.20) (-0.61) (1.72) (-1.12)
￿3￿ 3.05** 1.12 -9.37** 5.20**
(3.68) (1.58) (-4.46) (2.66)
￿4￿ 0.22** 0.07** -0.43** 0.14*
(6.69) (2.36) (-5.11) (1.81)
￿5￿ 0.06** -0.11** 0.15** -0.10
(2.25) (-4.94) (2.19) (-1.52)
43Table 7: Robustness check: Risk Sharing, Proprietary Income and Housing Collateral
Table reports the results of the panel GLS/OLS regressions ￿e ck;t = ￿U+￿k




U(t) is de￿ned as
￿k
U(t) = ￿U0 + ￿U1zk
t, where zk
t contains the aggregate and state characteristics listed in the ￿rst column. The collateral measure
myt is real estate wealth, that is de￿ned in detail in the data appendix. ￿k denotes time-series means of the share of proprietary inco-
me for every state k. Constants are not reported. The data are annual from 1963 to 1998. T-statistics are in parentheses. Signi￿cance
at the 10% (5%) level is indicated by ￿ (￿￿).
zk
t ( I ) ( II ) ( III ) ( IV ) ( V ) ( VI ) (VII) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
￿0U 0.41** 0.41** 0.39** 0.69** 0.70** 0.46** 0.43** 0.42** 0.45** 0.46**
(4.31) (4.10) (3.83) (3.96) (3.66) (2.31) (2.18) (1.98) (2.13) (2.14)
￿gdpt -3.42** -4.15** -3.89** -3.27** -3.80** 4.20 3.57 2.55 -2.82 -2.50
(-3.46) (-4.35) (-4.07) (-3.31) (-3.99) (1.47)** (1.24) (0.83) (-0.75) (0.66)
￿gdpt￿￿k -71.41 -64.63** -66.95** -71.48** -66.58**
(-2.83) (-2.52) (-2.19) (-2.36) (-2.16)
￿gdpt￿myt 9.21** 8.17
(2.67) (2.28)
￿k￿myt 6.60** 6.67* 4.78 4.71 4.19 3.19 3.56
(2.34) (1.90) (1.64) (1.62) (1.22) (0.92) (1.02)
￿k -1.93** -2.07** -1.98** -4.89** -5.17** -2.30 -2.28 -2.18 -1.41 -1.69
(-2.91) (-2.54) (-2.41) (3.21) (-2.73) (-1.25) (-1.24) (-1.00) (-0.65) (-0.77)
myt 0.01 0.21** 0.23** -0.61** -0.41 -0.48 -0.43 -0.18 -0.24 -0.25
(0.07) (2.08) (2.31) (-1.99) (-1.19) (-1.52) (-1.36) (-0.53) (-0.70) (-0.71)
Trend no no yes yes yes no yes yes no yes
Method OLS GLS GLS OLS GLS OLS OLS GLS GLS GLS
4
4Table 8: Robustness check: Risk Sharing and Asset Prices.
Table reports the results of the panel GLS/OLS regressions ￿e ck;t = ￿U+￿U(t)￿g gspk;t + ￿U
t + ￿k
U + ￿U
k;t. ￿U(t) is de￿ned as
￿U(t) = ￿U0 + ￿U1zt, where zt contains the aggregate characteristics listed in the ￿rst column. cayt is demeaned consumption-
wealth ratio. cayt is deviation from cointegrating relationship between consumption, asset wealth and labor income. CumDt is de￿-
ned as the fraction of states in the sample, that have deregulated. Constants are not reported. The data are annual from 1963 to 1998.
T-statistics are in parentheses. Signi￿cance at the10% (5%) level is indicated by ￿ (￿￿).
zt ( I ) ( II ) ( III ) ( IV ) ( V ) ( VI ) ( VII ) ( VIII )
￿0￿ 0.33** 0.27** 0.32** 0.32** 0.30** 0.19** 0.29** 0.19**
(11.43) (10.93) (11.22) (10.86) (9.97) (6.51) (9.68) (6.34)
￿gdpt -3.81** -3.86** -3.84** -4.59** -4.55** -4.67** -4.61**
(-5.15) (-4.08) (￿ 4.04) (-4.70) (-4.68) (-4.77) (-4.71)
cayt 14.32** 12.07** 12.86** 13.42** 8.98** 11.48** 8.20**
(5.94) (4.99) (2.29) (5.49) (3.68) (3.91) (2.90)
￿gdpt￿cayt -20.86
(-0.16)
￿gdpt￿CumDt 8.78** 10.24** 10.32** 11.06**
(3.11) (3.43) (3.33) (3.31)
cayt￿CumDt 7.05 3.55
(1.17) (0.54)
Method GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS OLS GLS OLS
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5Table 9: Robustness check: Monte Carlo Simulations
Table reports results from the Monte Carlo simulations for the share of proprietary income ￿k (Panel A),
intrastate banking deregulation SDDk;t (Panel B), and both the share of proprietary income ￿k and
intrastate banking deregulation SDDk;t (Panel C). We take 1000 random draws from the empirical dist-
ribution of these variables for each speci￿cation. In panels A and B the ￿rst row presents the percentage
of cases where estimated coe¢ cients in the regressions with ￿ placebo￿variable are more signi￿cant than
true ones. The second row reports the percentage of cases where estimated coe¢ cients are individually
signi￿cant. Superscript ￿Pdenotes a ￿ placebo￿variable and its associated coe¢ cient. Panel C reports the
percentage of cases for which the coe¢ cient on ￿gdp ￿ ￿g gsp
k
t is signi￿cant and correctly signed for
the high ￿/late deregulation group. See notes to Table 5 for details on how these groups are formed.
Panel A: Simulated ￿k
￿k





Percentage of simulated t-stats larger than t-stats from real data
b ￿1 100% c ￿P
2 3% c ￿P
3 50%
￿k
U(t) = ￿0 + ￿1￿gdpt + ￿2￿gdpt￿k + ￿P
2 ￿gdpt￿P
k + ￿3￿k + ￿P
3 ￿P
k
Percentage of signi￿cant t-stats
b ￿2 100% c ￿P
2 10% b ￿3 0% c ￿P
3 28%
Panel B: Simulated SDDk;t
￿k





Percentage of simulated t-stats larger than t-stats from real data
b ￿1 14% c ￿P
2 10% c ￿P
3 12%
￿k
U(t) = ￿0 + ￿1￿gdpt + ￿2￿gdptSDDk;t + ￿P
2 ￿gdptSDDP
k;t + ￿3SDDk;t + ￿P
3 SDDP
k;t
Percentage of signi￿cant t-stats
b ￿2 85% c ￿P
2 12% b ￿3 0.5% c ￿P
3 23%
Panel C: Simulated ￿k and SDDk;t
￿k
U(t) = ￿0 + ￿1￿gdpt for states with high ￿k and late deregulation
Percentage of cases for which coe¢ cient on ￿gdpt negatively signed and more signi￿cant
￿k = Share of proprietary income ￿k = Small Business Employment
b ￿1 0.3% b ￿1 0.2%
46Table A1: Importance of small businesses across U.S. states
Low Middle High
Shapik SBEk Shapik SBEk Shapik SBEk
1 Maryland S. Carolina New York Rhode Island California Iowa
2 Rhode Island Connecticut Alabama Alabama Colorado Colorado
3 Virginia Pennsylvania Pennsylvania West Virginia Oregon Arizona
4 Michigan Illinois Georgia Georgia Kentucky Washington
5 New Jersey Ohio Utah Minnesota Vermont Oklahoma
6 West Virginia Michigan Illinois Virginia Mississippi Kansas
7 Ohio Indiana Wisconsin Kentucky Texas Nebraska
8 Massachusetts N. Carolina Alaska Mississippi Wyoming Alaska
9 Connecticut Delaware New Mexico Maryland Oklahoma Oregon
10 S. Carolina Massachusetts North Carolina New Hampshire Kansas Hawaii
11 Hawaii Nevada Louisiana Texas Arkansas Florida
12 Delaware New York Missouri Maine Montana Idaho
13 Nevada D.of Columbia D. of Columbia California Idaho New Mexico
14 Florida Tennessee Maine Arkansas Nebraska Wyoming
15 Indiana New Jersey Washington Louisiana Iowa Montana
16 Arizona Wisconsin Tennessee Utah North Dakota South Dakota
17 New Hampshire Missouri Minnesota Vermont South Dakota North Dakota
Note: The states are ranked in ascending order according to the prevalence of small businesses measured by the
sample average share of proprietary income (Shapi) and 1977 small business employment (SBE).
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